In the past decades, numerous studies have been conducted on the trade-off between guns and butter, namely defense versus social sector expenditure. The aim of this research is identifying whether indeed defense spending crowded out investment and other social expenditures as health and education. Previous research does not yield strong and unambiguous evidence of neither positive nor negative effects of military expenditure on social spending. It is striking that the guns versus butter dilemma has not been extensively studied for Spain. Using Mintz and Huang (1991) 
I. Introduction
The relationship between military and welfare efforts by states and its economic and social effects during the twentieth century has often been examined in the past five decades. One of the most relevant approaches to study it has been the guns versus butter hypothesis, which is generally used as a simplification of national spending as a part of GDP. This theory is the classic example of the production possibility frontier and models the relationship between the spending of a country in military and civilian goods. Nations cannot have everything they want, being limited by the resources and the technology available to them. They are always being compelled to choose between two options when spending their finite resources. They will have to decide what level of defense and civilian goods best fulfills their needs. They can buy either guns or butter, or a mix of both, every choice having an opportunity cost: they can get more of something only by giving up something else (Samuelson, 1948) .
The existence or not of a trade-off relationship between military outlays and welfare spending and its economic and social effects have received substantial coverage in the academic literature, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Most of them focused on the short-term or direct impact of defense outlays on welfare expenditures. Others have usually assumed that this impact is indirect or long-term in nature. In spite of the diversity of approaches, theories, methodologies, and data sets used, the literature indicates that the results are inconsistent and that we do not yet know whether guns come at the expense of butter. The results of research on the guns versus butter dilemma have depended on the formulation of the hypotheses, the budgetary trade-off categories taken into account, the influential factors on resource allocation considered, the specification, estimation techniques and methodologies utild, the design of crosssectional or longitudinal approach, the solution to statistical problems such as multicolinearity and autocorrelation, the effects considered (aggregated or disaggregated), and last but not least the period examined (wartime or peacetime) and the use of actual, final or partial budgetary data (Berry and Lowery, 1990; Huang and Mintz,1992; Jurado-Sánchez,2012 ).
The guns-butter trade-off is a remarkable topic in Public Economics, Defense Economics and Political Science which has been analyzed for about thirty countries.
The majority of them are European countries, 16 being currently members of the European Union (see Appendix 1), which represent the geopolitical environment of 3 Spain. In addition, most of the previous studies analyze the second half of the 20 th century, a period in which Spain was accelerating its economic and political convergence with Europe. According to statistics published by Eurostat, between 1960 and 2000, the annual average rate of growth of Spanish GDP was close to 4.5 per cent, one percentage point more than that of the EU-15, the Spanish GDP per capita reaching 81 per cent of UE-15 figure in the 1990s.These are good reasons why this article must be written, but there exist several more. In the first place, as far as we know, the gun versus butter theory has not yet been investigated for Spain. Secondly, this research will enable us to discover the Spanish case and to compare it with the most important Western nations, that is to say, to establish whether Spain was different in spending its resources on military and civilian goods. In addition, the interest of this study increases due to the guns versus butter dilemma is an issue which is closely connected to Public Finances, which nowadays present large shortfalls in Spain and many other Western countries. Lastly, the literature of the guns versus butter theory shows that it is necessary to choose in order to finance the diverse public goods or services, this decision having important economic and social effects. For example, the provision of welfare programs implies a lot of public spending with important economic effects, but social expenditures can be a counterbalancing factor which compensates for the effects of poverty and inequality and therefore reduces the probability of social unrest.
There are in the literature several diverse and suggestive empirical models to study the existence or non-existence of budgetary trade-offs between defense and welfare expenditures. Bearing in mind the theoretical and methodological basis and other factors, we have used probably the most appealing of them for researching topics of Public Economics, Defense Economics and even Economic History. We are referring to the indirect effect model applied by Mintz and Huang (1991) to the US case from 1953 to 1987.For these authors, increased defense outlays crowd out investment, which, in turn, dampens economic growth, thereby reducing the ability of governments to allocate more funds to welfare programs. Applying the indirect effect model, we intend to discover if during the 1950-2000 period the Spanish government expenditure on defense had a positive or negative effect on education spending.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a brief overview of the literature on the guns vs. butter dilemma is presented. Section 3 describes briefly the empirical model used in the paper. Section 4 introduces variables and data. Section 4 5 presents the main results and Section 6 gives some concluding comments and proposes issues for future research.
II. Guns versus butter theory: an overview of the literature
Early studies of the guns versus butter dilemma, made at the end of the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s, report the existence of a trade-off between guns and butter asserting that spending on defense comes at the expense of the welfare expenditures.
The time-series analysis of Pryor (1968) for the 1950-1962 period revealed that in those countries (Canada, Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and the United States) where military spending is a relatively large percentage of the public budget and the GDP, there were statistically relevant trade-offs between defense and public expenditures when transfer payments are excluded. Russet (1969 Russet ( , 1970 found that defense spending diverts resources available for private consumption and investment and several public expenditures in the United States (1939 States ( -1968 , Canada, France and the United Kingdom (1947 Kingdom ( -1965 . According to him, increases in defense spending led to decreases in personal consumption expenditures, fixed investment spending and in state and local USA governments' welfare, education and health spending.
Nevertheless, for Hollenhorst and Ault (1971) the impact of US military expenditures on economy and welfare spending varied substantially between the various sub-periods of war and peace contained in the 1939-68 period. These scholars believe that during the greater wars probably all society contributed to finance defense, while in the lesser wars it was the consumer who paid nearly the whole bill for military spending. Szymansky (1973) also found a negative relationship between defense spending and rates of growth of GNP and, with some important exceptions, unemployment in 18 industrialised countries during the 1950s and the 1960s, especially in those with the highest military expenditure/GNP ratios. According to Hartman (1973) , the evidence suggests that defense spending in the twentieth-century United
States had an inverse relationship to the general consumer's standard of living, corporate profit, balance of payments, investment and state and local government expenditures in health, education and welfare. Wilensky (1975) studied sixteen industrialised nations and showed that those countries with very high defense spending, 5 military and welfare were mutually exclusive goals, especially during the Cold War period. Peroff (1976) focused her analysis on tradeoffs between defense programs and three domestic public policies and found that the welfare program most undermined by military spending was public aid, following by the health expenditures in all levels of government and housing. Smith (1977) Mintz and Huang (1991) believe that one reason why investigations of the guns vs. butter dilemma seem to be partially supported in the empirical literature may be because only the direct budgetary trade-off between defense and welfare expenditures have been examined, usually assuming that the relationship between both kinds of outlays is zero-sum and, therefore, the direct effect of the former on the latter is expected to be negative. It is possible, however, these scholars assert, that military expenditure may have an indirect, negative effect on social spending, given that increased defense outlays crowd out investment, which, in turn, reduces economic growth, thereby diminishing the capacity of governments to allocate more funds to welfare programs. This indirect tradeoff, Mintz and Huang conclude, existed in the US during the 1953-1987 period, needed about six years to take place and reduced the education spending made by federal governments. Mok and Duval (1992) studied the expenditures on defense and welfare in the United States from 1954 to 1986. They found fairly strong evidence for the existence of certain trade-offs between defense and several civil programs (income security, energy, agriculture…), but other fail to produce a significant negative relationship (education and social security), while health and Medicare in fact produce a significant positive relationship with defense spending. Yildirim and Sezgin (2002) suggest that in Turkey from 1924 to 1996 there were tradeoffs between military and welfare spending, being negative between defense and health and positive between defense and education. These results support the idea that increased military expenditures reduce the resources available for health, but also suggest that defense does not crowd out education. Gifford (2006) believes that the inconsistent findings of empirical research on the guns vs. butter dilemma are due to the standard measure of military efforts utilised -military outlays-not being good enough to capture the whole impact of defense. For this reason, he analyses both defense spending 7 and military personnel as a more wide-ranging measure of a state's defense in a study of 16 developed and industrialised nations from 1960 to 1993. Gifford concludes that countries with large armed forces relative to their populations make smaller social welfare efforts, while nations with conscription tend to spend more on social programs.
III. Direct, indirect effect or both: Mintz and Huang model
The academic literature put at our disposal many different approaches, models and methods to study the relationships between defense outlays and welfare spending in Spain. Some of them are quite revealing, notably those of Russet (1982) , Domke, Eichenberg and Kelleher (1983) , Barry and Lowery (1990) , Mok and Duval (1992) , and Gifford (2006) . Nevertheless, taking into account the theoretical and methodological fundamentals, the data availability for Spain and other factors, it seems that one of the most appealing to carry out a research on a topic of Public Economics, Defense Economics and even Economic History is the indirect effect model by Mintz and Huang (1991) .These authors hypothesise, firstly, that when military expenditures increase, investment is reduced. This trade-off is due to military spending and investment competing for the non-consumption part of the total productive capacity of the economy and to private and non-military public consumption accounting for more than half of the total output of the economy with both being highly resistant to reductions. In addition, increased levels of defense outlays may also entail higher taxes or government borrowing, funds that otherwise might have gone to investment. Secondly, they expect, so long as investment is a crucial element of economic growth, that military spending will have a negative, indirect effect on growth. Lastly, they also suppose that the link between economic growth and education spending is positive, given that the former propelled the expenditures in all government programs, including the latter.
Mintz and Huang propose a three-equation system to analyze both direct and indirect effects of military exp enditure on welfare programs: on the one hand, the direct effect, namely the high opportunity costs of military expenditure from a socio-economic point of view, since scarce resources are absorbed that could otherwise have been utilised more effectively in education endeavor; on the other hand, they include in the analysis the indirect effect through the crowding-out effect of military spending on investment to reflect the fact that military spending may reallocate potential private and public expenditure away from investment, thereby reducing economic growth, and 8 consequently negatively affecting to welfare expenditure. We follow the model specification of Mintz and Huang (1991) Clark (1917) and then modified by Koyck (1954) and Chenery (1952) that considers gross investment, I, as a distributed lag on production, Y, and depreciation, approximated by a proportion of the capital stock, K. Therefore,
Where  is the difference operator. National accounting states that
where C is consumption, NX are net exports (exports-imports),
G is the government purchases of goods and services. Assuming that t
where M is military spending and NM is non-military outlays and t
where P is production in the private sector, then:
We can divide each side of (1) by Y, that is, every variable is going to be a proportion of the GDP. Plugging (2) in (1), assuming a finite number of lags and including a random error, equation (1) can be written as a testable equation:
ii)
The indirect effect of military expenditure on growth is analyzed through an equation that allows the crowding out effect to be measured.
where L is the civilian labor force and all other definitions are as above. Taking into account that G = M + NM, equation (4) can be written as:
In equation (5) Finding direct and indirect effects of military expenditure on education will involve estimating equations (3), (5) and (6), which represent a system of three linear regressions that can be individually estimated by OLS assuming that their disturbances are not correlated. Alternatively, one could think that equation errors are likely to be subject to correlated spillovers from economy-wide shocks. For the latter case, using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) may provide more efficient estimates by combining information on different equations (Zellner, 1962) .
IV. Data description
We until the mid-1990s and then stays stable, this probably being due to the fact that in a democratic system both the preferences of average voter and the demands for social spending diminish the allocation of money to defense efforts (Goldsmith, 2003; Sprout and Sprout, 1968) . We are referring to the decline of duration of schooling, forced emigration of democratically minded intellectuals, professors and teachers, and so on. In spite of increasing public education expenditures from 1970 on, at the end of the Franco regime education spending was characterised by low public financing (Camps, 2013) . Probably, the stagnation and reduction of education spending during the transition to democracy was due to the second oil crisis (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) and the cuts in public spending implemented in the following years to tackle it. The economic recovery from 1986 onwards, driven by the integration of Spain in the European Economic Community, 12 made it possible for total public spending, including education expenditures, to increase strongly. Table 1 shows the individual OLS estimates for equations (3), (5) and (6). We compute robust standard errors using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator. These standard errors are consistent estimates of the true standard deviations of the estimated coefficient, even if the errors are heteroskedastic and/or autocorrelated.
V. Results
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Identifying direction and size of effects in equations (3), (5) and (6) This strategy has two main advantages: (1) it solves the measurement unit problem; and (2) estimating the model using the variables as defined in equations (3), (5) and (6) higher and more positive impact on investment than a one-standard deviation positive shock on government spending. Nonetheless, this result supports the military one-year delayed crowding-out effect found in Mintz and Huang (1991) .
Equation (5) Having shown that the crowding out effect of military spending reduced the GDP growth during the Franco regime, equation (6) allows us to analyze whether it also had a negative effect on education expenditure. Table 1 shows a positive two year delayed effect of the GDP growth on education expenditure. Based on previous analysis of equations (3) and (5) To test the robustness of the OLS estimator we will estimate the three equations using the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) estimator, including the same variables as for the individually estimated equations. Table 3 shows the error correlation matrix of the three equations estimated in Table 2 . Errors in equations (3) and (5) Table 4 shows the SUR estimate for the three equations. Some slight differences are found in equation (3). Changes in non-military expenditure only have an effect on the I/Y ratio with a three year delay. The rest of the effects in equations (5) and (6) seem to be similar.
To summarise we can conclude that:
1. Military and non-military expenditure produced a crowding out effect on private investment that turned out to reduce economic growth especially during the Franco's dictatorship period. Nevertheless, military spending appears to have a moderately 17 positive impact on economic growth during the transition and democracy part of the sample.
2. We found a delayed negative direct impact of military spending on education expenditure. In addition, a 2-year positive delay effect of growth is found statistically significant in explaining education spending. Therefore, both direct and indirect effects are found for the analyzed period.
3. Based on these results, the impact of increasing defense spending on education expenditure turned out to be negative during Franco's dictatorship period, since both direct and indirect effect moved in the same direction: higher military expenditure diminished investment and it brought down economic growth and consequently affected education expenditure negatively. On the contrary, for the second part of the sample, increasing defense expenditure turned out to increase growth in spite of the crowding out effect. Therefore, it would be difficult to identify the final effect on education spending. Probably it depended on the ability of the policy-makers to make spending decisions based on their implications for economic growth. It becomes clear that they must to take into account both the direct and indirect effect of defense spending. 
VI. Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the defense-economic growth-education relationship for Spain in the second half of the twentieth century. Previous empirical studies on the guns versus butter dilemma made for thirty countries, most of them in Europe, reported mixed results. An influential paper by Mintz and Huang (1991) 
